Recent refereed journal articles:
“Meaning, Rationality, and Guidance.” The Philosophical Quarterly 73, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 227–47.
“Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102, no. 2 (2021): 357–76.
“Davidson’s Answer to Kripke’s Sceptic.” Co-authored with Claudine Verheggen. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7, no. 2 (2019): 7–28.
Recent contributions to volumes & encyclopedias:
“Rule-Following and Intentionality.” Co-authored with Alex Miller. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
“Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.” In Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value, edited by Syraya Chin-Mu Yang and Robert H. Myers, 171–84. Logic in Asia: Studia Logica Library. Singapore: Springer, 2021.
Book Symposium: Donald Davidson’s Triangulation Argument (Editor), Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 59, no. 2 (2020).
“How not to Brush Questions under the Rug.” Invited contribution to Kripke’s ‘Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language’ at 40, edited by Claudine Verheggen. Under contract with Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: In his treatment of the Wittgensteinian paradox about rule-following, Saul Kripke represents the non-reductionist approach, according to which meaning something by an expression is a sui generis state that cannot be elucidated in more basic terms, as brushing philosophical questions under the rug. This representation of non-reductionism captures the way in which some of its proponents conceive of it. Meaning is viewed by these philosophers as an explanatory primitive that provides the basic materials for philosophical inquiry, but whose nature cannot serve as an object for that inquiry. There is, however, an alternative way of conceiving of non-reductionism, which makes it possible to tackle philosophical questions about the nature of meaning head-on.
Work in progress:
“Inference without Rules”
“The possibility of Linguistic Agency”